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ABSTRACT 
Trade in ivory is banned under CITES in an effort to protect the African elephant. The trade 
ban is supported by some range states, most notably Kenya, because they see the ban as an 
effective means for protecting a ‘flagship’ species, one that attracts tourists and foreign aid. It 
is opposed by some states, mainly in southern Africa, because their elephant populations are 
exceeding the capacity of local ecosystems with culling and other sources have resulted in the 
accumulation of large stocks of ivory. They argue that ivory trade will benefit elephant 
populations. The question of whether an ivory trade ban will protect elephant populations is 
addressed in this paper using a dynamic partial-equilibrium model that consists of four ivory 
exporting regions and a single demand region. Results indicate that a trade ban might not be 
successful in maintaining elephant populations, even if it leads to a stigma effect that reduces 
demand and increases the marginal costs of marketing ivory. The modeling results suggest 
that the species will survive only if the non-market value of elephants is taken into account. If 
rich countries compensate African range states according to marginal willingness to pay for 
elephants, optimal populations are lower than under an average payment, and, perhaps 
surprisingly, the interaction between tourism benefits and marginal compensation can lead to 
the demise of elephants in some regions where this would not occur otherwise. Finally, 
elephant populations are even projected to crash if range states can operate an effective quota 
scheme, even one that excludes poaching. Free trade in ivory and effective institutions that 
translate numbers of elephants into monetary payments may be the best hope for the elephant. 
  
Key Words: economics of elephant conservation; economics of ivory trade; trade bans; 
cartels and quota 
I. BACKGROUND 
Ivory has been a traded commodity since at least Old Testament times – King 
Solomon’s ships brought back ivory from Africa (I Kings 10:22) and his palace was inlaid 
with ivory (I Kings 22:39). Ivory was “commercially exploited by the Romans in ancient 
times and later by Arab traders and Europeans. ... Between 1890 and 1900, nearly 3.7 
million kg of ivory were traded in the London market alone, ... and some 60,000 elephants reached European markets every year during that period” (Blanc et al. 2002, p.15). Ivory 
exports from Africa had increased by 400% between 1850 and 1875, but losses in West 
Africa were particularly high, with the region dubbed the ‘ivory coast’ for good reason 
(Fischer 2005). As human population expanded during the 20
th Century, elephants were 
increasingly ‘confined’ to protected areas.
1 Beginning sometime in the 1960s or early 1970s, 
speculation grew that a complex combination of commercial trade and human-elephant 
interactions were causing a serious decline in elephant numbers. In Ivory Coast, for 
example, there were an estimated 1790 savanna and 3050 forest elephants in 41 isolated 
groups in 1984, but this declined to approximately 270 total elephants in perhaps 20 isolated 
groups by the early 2000s; numbers were reported to be declining at a rate of 300 poached 
and 90 legally killed elephants per year between 1976 and 1984, with poaching continuing 
to the present (Fischer 2005).
2
Iain Douglas-Hamilton was the first to compile data on elephant range, numbers and 
trends in the 1970s and 1980s (Burrill and Douglas-Hamilton 1987; Douglas-Hamilton 
1977-1979, 1993), but the first continent-wide population estimates became available in 
1987 and are reported in Table 1 as 1989 estimates (see ITRG 1989).
3 A comparison of first 
and subsequent estimates suggests that elephant populations in some areas may have fallen 
by half between 1981 and 1987 (Said et al. 1995, p.1); researchers speculate that the African 
elephant (Laxadonta africana) declined in population from 1.2 million to 600,000 elephants 
in one decade, although the supporting evidence for this is sparse (Barnes et al. 1999; Blanc 
et al. 2002). The magnitude of the estimated drop in numbers is difficult to believe because 
of the large scale of killings this would have entailed.   
Trade in ivory became regulated under the 1973 United Nations’ Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). CITES 
regulates commercial trade in endangered species using a ranking scheme: Appendix I 
contains species banned from international commercial trade; Appendix II lists species that 
may be traded but for which export permits are needed (issued at the discretion of the 
exporting state); and Appendix III includes species that are threatened and could become 
endangered in the future. Importing countries agree not to trade in species (or parts of or 
products from species) listed in Appendix I, and ensure that proper export permits 
accompany imports of species listed under Appendix II. States can apply sanctions on 
species listed under Appendix III at their discretion.   
Several modifications have been made to CITES that have had an impact on the 
status of the African elephant. In 1981, a provision was added at New Delhi (Conference 
                                                 
1 Elephants appear to know the boundaries between hunting zones and protected areas, having been 
observed to dash to and from watering holes located in the hunting zone and visibly relaxing again 
once inside the park boundary (Scully 2002, p.87). 
2 Fischer quotes data from Roth and Douglas-Hamilton (1991) and Barnes (1999) among others. 
3 These are likely an update of the 1987 values. Interestingly, funding for this research was provided 
primarily by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 
  2Resolution 3.15) that would permit transfer of certain populations from Appendix I (no 
trade) to Appendix II (limited trade) for the purposes of sustainable resource management, a 
provision that became known as the ‘ranching criterion’. In 1985, Resolution 5.21 provided 
for the systematic re-listing of species from Appendix I to II in cases where countries of 
origin could agree on a quota system that would enable countries to manage species 
sustainably. There was no provision for external (third-party) verification/control as quota 
was to be determined solely by participating states. At the same time, under Resolution 5.12, 
a Management Quota System (MQS) was created for the African elephant. The MQS relied 
solely on management decisions taken by the producing countries, with consuming 
(second-party) states agreeing to prohibit imports of ivory (and other elephant products) 
from these countries unless accompanied by an MQS permit. There were no externally 
enforced incentives for sustainable use, with most states basing their quotas on expected 
confiscations of poached ivory. Since consumer states could obtain ivory from non-MSQ 
states without question, and due to lack of border controls on illegal ivory, public 
confidence in the MQS failed and, in 1989, the elephant was moved to Appendix I status 
despite a population of around 600,000 elephants (Table 1), well above what might be 
considered a minimum viable population for survival of the species.
4
Five southern African elephant range states – Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, 
Malawi and South Africa – have generally opposed the Appendix I listing, because they 
have relatively large elephant stocks and elephants have become a nuisance in some Parks. 
These countries lobbied unsuccessfully in 1990 and 1994 to down-list their populations and 
re-open (limited) trade in ivory and other elephant products. While lifting the restrictions on 
trade is unlikely to happen in the short run, lobbying by the five southern African countries 
resulted in a decision in June 1997 (based on Resolutions 3.15 and 5.21), to permit 
Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to sell off nearly 50 tons of stockpiled ivory on a 
one-time basis. This constituted less than 60% of the ivory that these countries had 
accumulated as a result of confiscations from poachers, natural mortality, culling and 
destruction of problem animals. The ivory was sold to Japan in 1999 at a price of US$103 
per kg.
5 At COP12, in 2002, another one-off sale by Botswana, Namibia and South Africa 
was approved, but that sale had not yet been completed by the end of 2004. These one-off 
sales have re-opened debates about how the African elephant is to be sustainably managed, 
                                                 
4 Soulé (1987) suggests that 2000 animals are adequate to ensure survival of a large mammal species 
(although with great expense a species can recover even from small populations), while Kontoleon 
and Swanson (2003) use a minimum viable population of 500 for the Giant Panda. 
5 Citing Milliken (African Elephants and the Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to 
CITES, TRAFFIC Network Briefing Doc., www.traffic.org/briefings/elephants-11thmeeting.html), 
Bulte, Horan and Shogren (2001) indicate that COP10 agreed to permit non-commercial donors to 
buy ivory from stockpiles to enable range states to reduce their financial and security liabilities 
associated with the stockpiles, under the proviso that none of the ivory purchased in this way gets 
re-sold in any form at any future date. Other than the Japanese purchase, we know of no other 
purchases that have taken place. 
  3and what role trade will play. 
Population data presented in Table 1 suggest that the ivory trade ban has had at least 
some success. The rapid decline in elephant abundance that is thought to have occurred 
prior to and during the 1980s appears to have been halted, and indeed may even have been 
reversed. However, the underlying data for any such conclusion are not very good – 
estimates of elephant populations are contentious at best; few reliable estimates are 
available before 1989, and even those in Table 1 are categorized according to whether 
estimates are ‘definite’, ‘probable’, ‘possible’ or ‘speculative’. Further, the area surveyed in 
each of the four years varied, being lowest for the 1998 population estimates. Thus, 
population trends are indicative at best. 
The ivory trade ban remains controversial. Critics of the ban allege that endangered 
species might be placed at risk by the perverse incentives that a trade ban generates. 
Banning trade makes elephant conservation a less attractive activity, inadvertently 
promoting conversion of elephant habitat to other uses. In addition, by reducing or entirely 
eliminating revenues from elephant management and exploitation, a trade ban might 
undermine the incentive to manage the stock carefully and enforce property rights to 
elephants and/or their habitat (see Bulte, van Kooten and Swanson 2003). Conversely, 
supporters of the trade ban argue that enforcing property rights and sustainable harvesting 
regimes in (semi-) open access habitats is difficult and expensive. Hence, trade may 
stimulate illegal harvesting. In addition, it is suggested that the legal trade may facilitate the 
laundering of illegal ivory products.   
The purpose in this paper is to investigate the effects of the ivory trade ban on 
elephant stocks compared to the situation where trade is permitted. As long as rents from 
elephant exploitation remain in place (so the marginal benefits of harvesting elephants and 
marketing ivory exceed the marginal costs), a trade ban is unable to prevent some harvest of 
elephants and the sale of ivory in international markets. International poaching gangs will 
be able to capture some of the rent and market ivory through a variety of channels. However, 
the marginal costs of providing ivory will likely be higher under a trade ban than under 
legal trade, while demand will be reduced because some potential buyers will have a stigma 
against purchases of ivory (Fischer 2004). Under legal trade, the marginal costs of providing 
ivory will be lower, while the stigma factor will no longer apply as buyers assume elephant 
populations are being managed sustainably. 
We develop a dynamic bioeconomic mathematical programming model of ivory 
trade with four African exporting regions and one global importing region. Africa is divided 
into four regions because of differences in the size of their elephant populations, the 
institutional and biological challenges to protecting elephant stocks, the extent of poaching, 
and the importance of elephants in attracting tourists. The model is used in this paper to 
study the impacts of various institutional arrangements on economic well being and 
elephant numbers. In particular, if property rights to elephants can be clearly defined, there 
may be alternative institutional arrangements that lead to larger elephant numbers and a 
  4lower chance that the African elephant becomes extinct. One possibility is a quota regime, 
such as the MQS, but with stronger enforcement. A regime that permits sales of ivory but 
also pays elephant ‘owners’ according to the actual size of the elephant stock in a country 
may lead to greater holdings of elephants while providing ‘owners’ with revenues to police 
elephant herds against poachers. Different regimes are investigated to determine whether 
the trade ban is indeed the ‘best’ means to protect elephants. Results indicate that neither 
free trade nor a quota system can effectively protect the elephant unless accompanied by 
conservation payments from rich countries to range states or recognition that elephants 
provide important tourism benefits, or both. Since conservation payments are unlikely at 
this time, a trade ban appears to be the most effective policy for maintaining elephant herds 
in African range states where tourism is of little importance or the link between elephants 
and tourism benefits is not properly recognized. 
A theoretical model of ivory trade is presented in the next section, while the 
mathematical programming formulations are described in section III. How the programming 
model is parameterized is the subject of section IV, while results of alternative policy 
options and views about the effect of trade on demand and (legal and illegal) supply are 
provided in section V. The conclusions ensue.   
II. IVORY TRADE MODEL 
We begin by postulating a simple, static spatial price equilibrium ivory trade model. 
The model is described with the aid of Figure 1 – the international market for ivory. The 
African continent is the international source of ivory, as products from Asian elephants 
(Elephas maximus) are assumed to be sold only in the Asian market and usually within the 
country in which they are found and (illegally) harvested. Since the domestic African 
market for ivory is small with any ivory worked in Africa simply sold abroad (or sold 
domestically and smuggled abroad), ivory trade is assumed take place between Africa as the 
excess supplier and the rest of the world. The African excess supply function is denoted p
S 
in Figure 1, while the international excess demand for ivory (denoted p
D) is the demand left 
over after local ivory supply (from Asian elephants) is taken into account.   
The excess supply function under free trade equals the horizontal sum of the legal 
and illegal excess supply functions. (An indicator variable I is used to denote the effect of 
the trade ban on supply and demand, with I=0 indicating free trade and I=1 a trade ban.) 
Under free trade, an amount q* is traded at price P*. As a result of poached ivory, market 
equilibrium occurs at point v rather than point u (Figure 1), with q*–q
L amount of illegal 
African ivory sold internationally. The global benefits of ivory trade are given by the sum of 
the consumer and producer surpluses – area kvP* under the demand function p
D(I=0), plus 
area xzP* above the p
S(I=0)legal function. Assuming open access, the poachers’ supply curve, 
p
S(I=0)illegal, is not equivalent to a marginal cost function; hence, poachers receive no rents. 
(An alternative assumption is considered in the trade ban situation.)   
Illegal (poached) ivory masquerades as legal ivory when there is free trade. But an 
  5ivory trade ban does not halt all trade in ivory, although it does have two effects: First, the 
poachers’ supply function shifts upwards as the transaction costs of marketing ivory 
increase. While poachers always incur costs associated with illegal activities (e.g., avoiding 
anti-poaching patrols), costs of illegal activities increase as the costs of finding buyers and 
avoiding ban-imposed custom controls rise. Second, a trade ban shifts the (excess) demand 
function inwards because the ban creates a stigma associated with the purchase of things 
made from ivory (Fischer 2004). Under a trade ban competitive equilibrium occurs at w, 
although it would occur at y if there were no stigma effect or added marketing costs for 
poachers. What worries many environmental groups is that removal of trade restrictions will 
reduce the stigma of buying and owning ivory, implying greater numbers of elephants being 
harvested (at equilibrium v rather than w). 
An alternative to a trade ban is a quota. As already noted, a quota was in place prior 
to the ivory trade ban, but it was not controlled in any sense by the parties themselves or by 
outside parties. The quota can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 2. In the absence of 
poaching, an effective quota reduces ivory sales to the quota level Q, but poached ivory 
increases sales from Q to Q+, reducing the market price to PP
Q+ from P
Q
P . The illegal sales 
reduce the quota (scarcity) rents earned by African elephant states by PP
Q+nrP
Q (from area 
cdrP
Q to cdnP
Q+). Nonetheless, the quota results in lower harvests of elephants compared 
with competitive free trade (q*) and may even lead to lower levels of elephant harvest than 
under the trade ban if quota revenue is used to police illegal harvest. If policing increases 
the costs to poachers sufficiently, so that the intercept s of p
S(I=0)  is shifted upward so 
it lies above P
Q
Illegal
P , no illegal ivory will reach the market, effectively halting poaching.   
One obstacle to implementing a quota system is that African states must form an 
effective ivory trade cartel, somehow allocating quota among member states. Logically, this 
is best accomplished by allocating quota on the basis of existing elephant numbers. Quota 
trading will ensure that harvests are allocated in the most efficient fashion. The allocation 
mechanism will determine the distribution of rents and will need to be accepted by all 
parties to prevent cheating. Further, it is necessary to have in place institutions to enable a 
quota scheme to operate, namely, assignment and protection of property rights to elephants 
and their habitat, and monitoring and enforcement of elephant harvesting and ivory sales. It 
also requires policing of poaching throughout all range states. It is unlikely that proper 
monitoring and enforcement will be in place, but perhaps a portion of the revenues 
generated by the quota could be used to finance these aspects of the scheme. 
The discussion has thus far ignored dynamic aspects of elephant populations and the 
potential to store ivory, a non-perishable commodity, from one period to the next. This 
means that tusks confiscated from poachers, or obtained from animals that died of natural 
causes or were culled, enter storage. Given that ivory has value and that there are costs to 
wildlife programs, states with significant quantities of stored ivory, such as range states in 
southern Africa, will lobby to permit them to sell stocks, which is why CITES has permitted 
some one-off sales. The existence of stocks complicates the models discussed in Figures 1 
and 2. Along with the fact that elephants grow and reproduce, an analysis that includes 
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populations and harvests must be taken into account). Hence, a dynamic mathematical 
programming approach is used. 
Another aspect not considered in the spatial price equilibrium model is the 
non-market component to ivory trade, namely, the elephant’s role as a flagship species for 
attracting tourists and the willingness of the international community to protect elephants in 
situ, which is one reason for the ban on ivory trade. The ivory trade model needs to 
incorporate potential payments by rich (European and North American) countries to African 
states on the basis of the numbers of elephants that are retained in situ. To be effective, 
however, payments must be made to those with property rights to elephants and/or their 
habitat. It is the owners, whether states, individuals or communities, that need to have 
appropriate incentives to harvest or protect elephants. Payments to protect elephants will 
increase numbers beyond what they are currently, or at least possibly preventing elephants 
from being added to the list of endangered species. 
III. MODEL FORMULATION 
Consider first an idealized dynamic bioeconomic model in which the global net 
benefits from ivory trade and elephant conservation are maximized over time. There is one 
net consuming region and several regions that ‘produce’ elephants (range states) and market 
ivory. Initially there is no poaching, and institutions are such that payments from rich 
countries to range states for elephant conservation have the desired conservation effect. The 
model is modified to include poaching and then expanded to examine the failure of 
conservation payments, the potential of a quota regime, and the costs and benefits of an 
ivory trade ban. Compared to Fischer (2004), the advantage of the current approach is that it 
permits richer detail, although many of her results are confirmed. 
The model also permits countries (but not poachers) to store ivory, which they will 
do under free trade as long as the expected increase in price exceeds the costs of holding 
stocks. Under a trade ban, stock holding is non-voluntary. Kremer and Morcom (2000), and 
Bulte, Horan and Shogren (2001), also consider the interplay between elephant harvests and 
ivory stocks. They point out that: (1) governments can use stockpiled ivory as a threat 
against poachers – threatening to release ivory and drive prices low enough to stop poaching; 
and (2) it might be possible for an agent to hoard sufficient stocks to make it worthwhile for 
the agent to drive elephants to extinction. These researchers provide no evidence that either 
of these outcomes is likely, but extinction of elephants dominates conservation in all the 
realistic scenarios they examine and it never appears to pay for an agent to hoard ivory. 
Our objective is to maximize the discounted net global benefits of selling ivory and 
conserving elephants over some planning horizon. It is given by the sum of consumer and 
producer surpluses from marketing and selling ivory, ivory storage costs, elephant harvest 
costs, the spillover costs elephants impose on the ecosystem (here taken to be landowners), 
benefits from tourism, and the off-site preservation benefits of keeping elephants in situ: 
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d(I, q) is the inverse (excess) demand function for ivory; qj,t is the quantity of ivory at 
time t made available for sale on the international market by region j (of which there are N); I 
is an indicator variable set equal to 1 when trade is prohibited and 0 otherwise; and c(I, a), 
where a is an integration variable, is the marginal cost function associated with the production 
and marketing of ivory once elephants (denoted by x) have been harvested (denoted h). Thus, 
the first two terms in expression (1) are the consumer surplus plus the quasi-rent accruing to 
ivory sellers. Note that the marginal cost function is not quite the same as the supply function, 
p
S(I) in Figure 1, because it does not include elephant harvesting and opportunity costs that 
are taken into account by the other terms in (1). In expression (1), k(I) is the per unit cost of 
harvesting animals and s is a fixed cost of holding ivory stocks (S). Given the importance of 
elephants in attracting tourists, which is of greater relevance in some regions of Africa than 
others, R(xj,t) is a function linking elephant numbers to a region’s tourism benefits. D(xt) is a 
measure of the damage elephants impose on the ecosystem, and B(xt) is conservation or in situ 
benefits that elephants provide at time t, with xt =  . The cost of harvesting elephants is 
not density dependent as elephants are quite large and assumed to be easily tracked, but the 
cost is higher when trade is banned and poaching occurs. The factor β=1/(1+δ), where δ is the 








At any time, the stock of ivory in a given region, Sj,t, will depend on the stock in the 
preceding period plus additions to the stock from elephant ‘harvests’ minus any sales of 
ivory. For convenience, it is assumed that no stocks of ivory are held outside of the elephant 
range states. Elephant harvests may be the result of decisions to eliminate troublesome 
animals, cull animals because there are too many for the particular ecosystem, or simply 
harvest animals for sale of ivory, as well as incidental take due to natural mortality or 
confiscations of illegal ivory. The stock equation is given by: 
(2)  Sj,t+1 = Sj,t + γhj,t – qj,t,  , t=1, ..., T–1   (Ivory  stock  holding  dynamics)  j ∀
where γ is a parameter that converts elephants to ivory. Countries can sell ivory or hold it until 
a later period, but sales of ivory cannot exceed available stocks in any period: 
(3)  qj,t ≤ Sj,t,  .            (Sales of ivory cannot exceed available stock)  t j, ∀
In addition to a stock constraint, an equation is needed to describe the growth and harvest of 
elephant populations: 
  8(4)  xj,t+1 – xj,t = g(xj,t) – hj,t,  , t=1, ..., T–1  (Elephant population dynamics)  j ∀
where g(xj,t) is the elephant growth function that might exhibit logistic or depensational 
growth (van Kooten and Bulte 2000, pp.184-189). It is discussed in greater detail below.  
For each region, initial (opening) stocks of ivory and elephants need to be identified: 
(5)  Sj,0 =  j S , xj,0 =  j x , .      (Initial  conditions)  j ∀
In addition, non-negativity constraints need to be imposed: 
(6)  qj,t, Sj,t, xj,t, hj,t ≥ 0,  .      (Non-negativity)  t j, ∀
Lastly, it is possible to specify optional sustainability conditions. Sustainability can be 
specified, for example, as an endpoint constraint on elephant stocks in each region, or as a 
requirement that elephant numbers remain at or above some minimum viable population level 
(m ):  
(7)  xj,T ≥  ,   or  x j x ˆ j ∀ j,t ≥  m ,  t j, ∀ .   (Sustainability  criterion) 
The sustainability constraint is meant primarily to satisfy international demands that elephant 
stocks be maintained. Less restrictive versions of (7) might require that the total of elephant 
stocks across all range states exceed some specified value at t=T, or that this total exceed 
some minimum value in each period t. Alternative sustainability requirements can be 
investigated, but the African elephant could also be allowed to go extinct. Sustainability is 
difficult to enforce and this aspect is left to future research.  
The forgoing expressions form the basis of several models that can be used to 
investigate the effects of poaching and different institutional arrangements on wellbeing and 
elephant conservation. They can be used to determine which policies and perspectives are 
likely to be the most effective in protecting elephants.   
Global Wellbeing with No Poaching 
The first question of interest is: What are the consequences of free trade when there 
is no poaching? The following mathematical program is used to examine the consequences 
for elephant conservation of maximizing global welfare in this case:
6
                                                 
6 In P1, as in later formulations, an optional sustainability constraint can be included. 
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Subject to: (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6). 
Global Wellbeing with Poaching 
Next, consider the real-world case where elephant poaching and illegal ivory sales 
occur. It is assumed that the decision maker maximizes benefits as before, taking into 
account the supply function of poachers, although it can affect this supply through 
anti-poaching monitoring and enforcement (Bulte and van Kooten 1999). The supply of 
illegal ivory from region j at time t is assumed to be a function of the international price p
d 
and anti-poaching effort E:  =f
p
t j q , j(E,  p
d), where q
p denotes sales of illegal ivory from 
poached elephants (with poached elephants to be denoted h
p in what follows). While E is a 
potential decision variable, it is left as a subject for future research, although it might be 
possible to use simulation analysis to examine the role of enforcement (which is not done 
here). Rather, it is simply assumed that illegal ivory is confiscated at a constant rate (ξ) as a 
result of fixed-cost anti-poaching programs. The mathematical bioeconomic modeling 
program can now be written as: 
P2:  
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Subject to: (3) and (5), plus: 
(2′) Sj,t+1 = Sj,t + γhj,t – qj,t + ξ   , t=1, ..., T–1 
p
t j q , j ∀ (Ivory stock holding)  





j ∀ , t=1, ..., T–1  (Elephant dynamics) 




t j h , t j, ∀ (Non-negativity) 






t j , , γ , , , ∀ − ≤ ξ
(Sales of poached ivory cannot 
exceed ivory from poached elephants 
minus confiscations) 








, , (Adding up) 




t j , , ) , 0 ( , , ∀ =   (Supply of illegal ivory from each 
region) 
  10Constraint (8) is required so that sales of illegal ivory cannot exceed ivory available 
from poached elephants; it is assumed that illegal ivory is sold in the same period the 
poached elephants are killed and that poachers do not stockpile ivory (although some of the 
poached ivory is confiscated). Relaxation of this assumption is a topic for future research. 
Constraints (9) and (10) determine the global price of ivory and the amounts of illegal ivory 
sold by each region.
7 The last term in (4′) indicates the number of elephants that poachers 
would harvest. It is also assumed that poachers do not hold ivory stocks but that confiscated 
ivory enters stocks. 
African Welfare with Competitive Selling and Poaching 
Now consider the case where only the wellbeing of African elephant range states is 
important. In that case, we eliminate as a consideration the wellbeing of ivory buyers. 
Further, conservation payments for elephants held in situ are rarely if ever made, and 
certainly not on the basis of total willingness to pay (WTP). One alternative is that 
conservation payments are paid (if at all) on the basis of the contribution that the last 
elephant on the continent makes to preservation benefits, that is, on the basis of marginal 
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Subject to the same constraints as in P2. 
In this case, because they face a downward sloping WTP function, the range states would 
maximize the revenue from conservation payments by significantly reducing elephant 
stocks. To avoid this, rich countries could simply declare that they would pay range states a 
fixed amount per elephant – so that B'(x)=B
0≥0, where B
0 is a constant that is zero if no 
conservation payments are made.     
An Ivory Cartel with Poaching 
Suppose that the African range states could form an ivory cartel, maximizing their 
overall wellbeing from sales of ivory, while somehow allocating elephant harvests and ivory 
exports in a manner acceptable to all countries. In that case, an additional efficiency 
condition requires that marginal costs of harvesting elephants and marketing ivory are the 
same in each region and equal to marginal revenue. Damage from elephants is ignored in 
this marginality condition, but not the marginal cost of harvesting elephants for their ivory. 
The cartel determines how much ivory is sold on the market in each period from each of the 
N regions, as well as how many elephants are to be harvested in each region for their ivory. 
                                                 
7 Given the assumption underlying constraint (8), this implies that illegal sellers have some notion or 
forecast of the price. Further research is required into alternative formulations, perhaps ones that 
involve holding of illegal stocks.   
































t j t j














Subject to the same constraints as in P2 plus: 
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≥ +   (Marginality condition:  
MCj ≥ MR) 
Ivory Trade Ban with Poaching 
Finally, consider the case of the ivory trade ban (I=1). In order to study the effect on 
elephant herds in the various African regions, we take the perspective of the criminal gangs 
that sell ivory illegally in international markets. It is assumed that they maximize 
quasi-rents (producer surplus) from marketing ivory, but that they cannot form a cartel. If 
they were somehow able to exert market power, then less ivory will be sold than under the 
assumptions of program P5 and even less elephants will be killed. Hence, the trade ban case 
considered here might be regarded as a worse-case, trade-ban scenario. Any sustainability 
constraint that might be imposed also falls away since poachers are not concerned about 










































Subject to: (4) and (8), with (8) replacing (3), plus 
(4′′) xj,t+1 – xj,t = g(xj,t) –  , t=1, ..., T–1 
p
t j h , j ∀ (Modified elephant dynamics) 
(5′) xj,0 =  j x ,   j ∀ (Initial condition on elephant numbers only) 
(6′′)   x , ,
p
t j q j,t,  ≥ 0,   
p
t j h , t j, ∀ (Modified non-negativity) 




t j ∀ ∑ =
=1
, (Modified adding up) 
 
Model P5 implies that elephants are not truly an open access resource, but a derived 
demand. Illegal killing of elephants may still occur under open access, however, if tusks are 
illegally stockpiled, elephants are killed for bush meat and/or hides, or illegal killing is done 
by peasants simply to get rid of troublesome animals. While stocks of ivory are considered 
immaterial in P5, since only governments are assumed to stockpile ivory, future research 
  12might be able to separate illegal and legal stock holding, thereby enabling ‘criminals’ to 
hold ivory stocks as a hedge against unforeseen future price changes, for example.   
IV. DATA AND MODEL PARAMETERIZATION 
A major problem in implementing the forgoing models concerns the availability of 
data. Few data are available and much of that is based on local observations in range states 
(e.g., Menon 2002). The IUCN Species Survival Commission has tracked elephant numbers 
for the past decade and a half (ITGR 1989; Said et al. 1995; Barnes et al. 1999; Blanc et al. 
2003), while the international community has implemented Monitoring the Illegal Kill of 
Elephants (MIKE) and the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) to keep an eye on 
illegal activities exacerbated by the trade ban. MIKE started in October 2001 and is 
managed by the CITES Secretariat through a Central Coordinating Unit headed by a 
Director based in Nairobi, while ETIS is managed by TRAFFIC (http://www.traffic.org/) – 
a joint program of the World Wildlife Fund and the World Conservation Union (IUCN). 
MIKE represents an effort to monitor illegal elephant killing in elephant states by 
developing the capacity of wildlife agencies to use their anti-poaching patrols and other 
methods for detecting carcasses, recording what they find and entering information into a 
standardized database. The agencies also undertake to conduct population surveys on a two 
to three year cycle. ETIS is an international monitoring system to track illegal trade in 
elephant products (mainly ivory), but it relies on individual countries to report seizures. 
While ETIS has published time series of seizure data by country that could provide a 
starting point for an analysis of the impact of species’ listing and trade on seizures (see 
Figure 3) (Milliken et al. 2004), progress on MIKE has been more limited because it is 
taking time to get the system up and running (Hunter, Martin and Milliken 2004).   
A detailed specification of the consumer and producer surplus components of the 
objective function (1) as employed in the mathematical programming model is provided in 
Appendix A. There is insufficient information to determine the pre-ban and post-ban 
demand functions,    p
d(0, q) and p
d(1, q), respectively. Fischer (2004) reports that ivory was 
trading for about $150 per kg in the pre-ban period, with price peaking at over $1,200 per 
kg shortly after the ban’s imposition and then settling at some $450/kg thereafter.
8  
The only information about quantities traded pertains to reported seizures of 
elephant products. The first year for which these are reported is 1989, the year of the trade 
ban. From Table 2, the average number of annual seizures of illegal elephant products (as 
they crossed international borders) increased by 120% after 1989, although, as indicated in 
Figure 3, there is no real discernable trend in the amount of illegal ivory sold in the years 
following the trade ban, at least based on reported seizures. It appears that illegal activity 
continues unabated. Hunter, Martin and Milliken (2004) use observations on ivory carvers 
                                                 
8 In comparison, Kremer and Morcom (2000) cite Simmons and Kreuter (1989) for prices of 
uncarved elephant tusks: $7/lb ($9.20/kg) in 1969, $52/lb ($114.40/kg) in 1978, and $66/lb 
($145.20/kg) in 1989 (with 2.2 lb = 1 kg). 
  13in various regions of Africa and Asia to estimate that between 6,433 and 16,185 African 
elephants (and 123 to 349 Asian elephants) are still supplied illegally to the market each 
year (Table 2). This implies that between 44.4 and 111.7 tonnes of illegal ivory from African 
elephants still enter the market annually, or about one-tenth of what was marketed (legally 
and illegally) under free trade.   
Given a dearth of additional information, we simply assume that the excess demand function 
in Figure 1 can be written as:
9
(12)   p
d(I=0) = 720 – 0.0005 q. 
According to (12), at a real pre-ban price of $150/kg, some 1140 tonnes of ivory 
would be traded. What would be sold under a trade ban assuming the demand curve changes 
due to a stigma effect? If the pre-ban demand function (12) continued to describe the 
situation, the market price of the ivory would be $664-$698 per kg. As noted, however, it is 
reported to be nearer $450 per kg. We assume that the intercept on the post-ban excess 
demand curve has shifted down by this difference, or by about $220 (=$670 – $450), so that 
the no-trade excess demand function can be described by: 
(13)   p
d(I=1) = 500 – 0.0005 q. 
At a price of $450 per kg, only 100 tonnes of African ivory would be sold internationally, 
well within the range estimated by Hunter, Martin and Milliken (2004) and indicated 
above.
10
On the supply side, the African continent is divided into four regions that represent 
different elephant subspecies – the savanna elephant (Laxodonta africana africana) and the 
forest elephant (Laxodonta africana cyclotis) – and elephant economics. The forest elephant 
is difficult to view and is found primarily in West and Central Africa, with populations in 
West Africa rather small and insignificant in continental terms (Table 1). The savanna 
elephant is an important flagship species for the tourism industry. While important in all 
states of East and Southern Africa, populations in the latter region have threatened the 
ecosystem carrying capacity, so elephants have been culled and ivory stockpiled. Thus, 
while Kenya is concerned about the adverse impacts of ivory trade, states in Southern 
Africa have lobbied to sell ivory. 
                                                 
9 Based on seven pre-ban observations on price and presumed ivory sales from various CITES 
sources, deflated prices (2000 US$ per kg) were regressed on quantity (kg of ivory) and time (with 
1960=1 and 1989=29) to obtain: 
  P = 220.025 – 0.00046 q + 16.581 t, R
2 = 0.883  F=7.059* 
   (1.83)    (–2.37)
*     ( 3 . 7 3 )
**
where the t-statistics are provided in parentheses, 
** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
or better and 
* indicates significance at the 5% level. Assuming this regression result is a demand 
function (ignoring identification and other problems) and taking t=30 gives result (12). 
10 Based on the calculations provided here, the price paid by Japan in 1999 ($103/kg) is likely low. 
  14It is assumed that, in addition to the costs of harvesting elephants (see equation (1)), 
there is a fixed cost plus a per unit cost of taking ivory out of stocks and bringing it to 
market. The fixed cost represents the transportation and search costs (finding markets). Both 
fixed and per unit costs are higher when a trade ban is in place as transactions are illegal. To 
determine the supply functions in each region, we begin by assuming that under a trade ban, 
100,000 kg of ivory would sell for $450/kg. To determine the regional illegal supply 
functions, we further assume that 60% of the illegal supply (or 60,000 kg) comes from 
Central Africa, since Hunter, Martin and Milliken (2004) argue that much of the illegal 
supply originates in this region. The amounts coming from the other regions are indicated in 
Table 3. If we assume linear supply functions and guesstimates of the intercepts, it is then 
possible to determine the slopes of the supply curves based on the share of the total quantity 
of illegal ivory that each region contributes to the market. The intercept and slope 
parameters for the illegal supply (marginal cost) functions under a trade ban are provided in 
Table 3. 
In order to construct the legal and illegal supply functions, a number of assumptions 
need to be made. Under free-trade, 1140 tonnes of ivory are traded at a price of $150/kg. At 
that price, regions are assumed to supply legal ivory to the market according the proportions 
indicated in Table 3 (roughly based on the proportions in Table 1). However, not all of the 
ivory sold is from legal stocks. Under a ban, 100 tonnes of ivory are assumed to be supplied 
illegally (as noted above); with free trade, we assume that 200 tonnes are provided illegally 
with the proportion of the illegal supply from each region the same as under the ban. Thus, 
780 tonnes per annum are supplied legally. We assume that the illegal supply functions are 
flatter and have shifted down compared to the trade-ban case, because trade reduces 
anti-poaching effort and makes it easier to launder poached ivory. The legal supply 
functions are assumed to have a lower ordinate intercept and to be flatter than the illegal 
supply curves, as marginal costs of supplying ivory to the international market must be 
lower for legal suppliers than illegal ones. The intercept and slope parameters for the illegal 
and legal supply functions in the case of trade are also provided in Table 3. 
Anti-poaching effort can affect the supply of illegal ivory. Unfortunately, there is 
little information about the effect that law enforcement has on the illegal supply of ivory. 
Milliken et al. (2004) provide two measures of law enforcement effort – the Corruption 
Perception Index score (which for a region would be the average of the country scores) and 
an index of enforcement given by “the total number of in-country seizures divided by the 
total number of seizures” (p.23). Arguably, the World Bank’s (2005) Governance and 
Anti-corruption indicators are a better indicator of enforcement ability than the Corruption 
Perception Index. Thus, rather than a single index for each region, four indexes are provided 
for each of the regions in the model (see Table 4). Further, Milliken et al.’s index of 
enforcement, but then adjusted for elephant populations and normalized for Africa, is also 
provided in Table 4 for each region. West and Central Africa have the worst scores, 
respectively, in terms of enforcing the ivory trade ban, and these low scores accord with the 
World Bank’s low measures of performance related to government effectiveness, rule of law 
and corruption. East Africa performs just as poorly on the World Bank’s indicators, but does 
  15relatively better in the enforcement of the ivory trade ban, perhaps because of the 
importance of the elephant to the economies of East African states. States in Southern Africa 
are more prone to enforce ivory trade laws and are generally better performers on other 
measures as well, but all states in Africa lag well behind states in Asia that purchase 
elephants and countries of Europe and North America (see Bulte, van Kooten and Swanson 
2004). As part of the analysis, it is assumed that African range states can do better in the 
enforcement of illegal killing of elephants and trade in elephant parts.   
To describe the fecundity, mortality and growth characteristics of elephants, we 
specify the following simple linear function:
11
(14)   xt+1 = (1+r) xj,t, with xj,t ≤ Kj  t j, ∀ , 
where r is the growth rate in elephant stocks and Kj is the elephant carrying capacity for 
ecosystems in region j. Set r=0.067 (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992) and initial 
elephant populations equal to the elephant totals for each region in 2002 (Table 1). The 
carrying capacity of each region is determined from information about elephant range and 
the proportion of elephant range that is protected. For the forest elephant, it is assumed that 
unprotected elephant range has a carrying capacity of 0.15 elephants per km
2, while it is 
0.25 elephants per km
2 for protected range. The carrying capacity of open range is higher, 
so it is assumed to be 0.20 per km
2 for unprotected and 0.35 for protected range in the case 
of the savanna elephant. Background information and carrying capacities are provided in 
Table 5. The estimated continental carrying capacity of about 974,000 elephants is lower 
than numbers existing in the early 1970s (some 1.2 million), but elephant range has also 
decreased significantly since then due to rising human populations and encroachment. 
Ivory stocks are largely unknown, although Milliken (1997) estimates that there are 
some 462.5 tonnes of verifiable and legitimately held stocks of ivory in Africa, and another 
243 tonnes of undeclared (perhaps illegal) ivory, or a total of 705.5 tonnes. This amount is 
allocated across regions in proportion to each region’s number of elephants. One estimate of 
extant stocks is to add to these estimates the increase in stockpiled ivory over the period 
1997-2004 relying on information reported by Milliken et al. (2004). Average seizures by 
region are provided in Table 2 for the period 1990-2003, while the raw ivory equivalent 
weight of an average seizure over the period 1989-2004 was 0.498 kg. Assume that seized 
ivory accounted for half of the increase in ivory stocks, with the remainder coming from 
culling, killings of troublesome animals, and, in some regions, legal hunting for monetary 
gain. Using this information to determine the increase in stocks since 1996 gives the 
estimates provided in the next to last row of Table 5. One could also argue that, using 
                                                 
11 An alternative is to employ the standard logistics growth function: xt+1 – xt = r xt (1– xt/K), where r 
is the intrinsic growth rate in elephant stocks and K is the ecosystem’s elephant carrying capacity. 
However, for this discrete form and the parameters used in this model, it leads to an immediate 
reduction in elephant numbers by half even without harvests. 
  16Milliken’s (1997) estimate of 1996 stocks, an average of 88.2 tonnes of ivory were added to 
stocks each year. If this continued up to 2004, there would be some 1300 tonnes of 
stockpiled ivory. As the exact number is unknown, we assume 900 tonnes of stocks 
allocated as indicated in the last row of Table 5. Further, we assume a constant rate of 
confiscations of 5%, so ξ =0.05. 
Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams (1992) estimate poaching costs to be about 
$180 per elephant. Thus, it is assumed that c(I=1)=$180; arbitrarily choose one-third of this 
amount to be legal harvesting costs, c(I=0)=$60. While Kenya and Mozambique, for 
example, do not permit hunting of elephants, hunting is allowed in some states. Nonetheless, 
Scully (2002, pp.47, 86, 122) reports that, in 1999, Safari Club International members could 
pay some $10,000 for the ‘privilege’ of hunting an elephant (likely in southern Africa and 
specifically Zimbabwe). Although left to future research, for southern Africa at least, we 
could consider elephant harvests yielding a benefit of $10,000.   
The costs of holding ivory stocks consist of the forgone opportunity cost (given by 
the discount rates) and a physical cost of holding ivory, which is assumed to be small, 
s=$0.50/kg each period.   
Average tusk weight has dropped significantly since 1970, probably because older 
animals with larger tusks were killed first, so current stocks of elephants tend to be much 
younger. Scully (2004, p.123) points out that it took 55 elephants to obtain 1 tonne of ivory 
in 1979, compared to 113 elephants around 1990 (p.123) – a decline from 18.18 to 8.85 kg 
of ivory per animal.
12 Not only is tusk size (and the age of elephants) declining, but more 
are born without tusks. Yacob et al. (2004) measured 31 tusks of elephants in Eritrea and 
found an average tusk weight of 8.7 kg, while Hunter, Martin and Milliken (2004) report 
that, based on 7800 ivory seizures, the average tusk weighs 3.68 kg – they use this 
information to convert estimates of ivory being carved into number of elephants killed 
illegally. Both male and female African elephants grow tusks (while only male Asian 
elephants have tusks), but for whatever reason the average number of tusks per African 
elephant is 1.88. Thus, the above values convert to 16.4 kg and 6.9 kg of ivory per elephant. 
Because of the disparity in estimates and that weights have declined over time, we choose 
γ=7.5 kg of ivory per elephant. 
Bulte and van Kooten (1996) assume a linear damage function, D(x)=dx, with the 
constant cost imposed by elephants on the ecosystem, d, determined by the amount of 
forage that an elephant consumes annually (which is equivalent to the consumption of 4.7 
                                                 
12 Scully quotes David Chadwick. Scully (2002, pp.69-71) also reports that, after making ‘donations’ 
to several local Mozambique causes (including a hospital), three members of the Safari Club 
International killed, among other animals, three elephants in July 1998, despite an unambiguous 
1990 law prohibiting elephant hunting in Mozambique. The largest of the elephants had tusks 
weighing an incredible 92 lbs (41.8 kg) each! 
  17cows or about 36,500 kg of dry matter). This forage is valued at d=$165.
13  
East Africa (particularly Kenya) benefits from wildlife tourism, with the elephant 
considered to be a charismatic flagship species. The same is true of Southern Africa, but 
probably to a slightly lesser extent. Bulte, Horan and Shogren (2001) assume the following 
relationship for tourist benefits: R(x) = 14.4 million × ln(x). However, their relationship is 
for all Africa, so that the total tourism benefits peak at about $900 million per year for the 
total population of elephants. This is a large value compared to the estimated gain to Kenya 
of $45 million in 1995 from wildlife tourism (Earnshaw and Emerton 2000, as cited by 
Bulte et al. 2001). Suppose we more than triple this value to $150 million to account for 
potential increases in tourism, inflation and other countries in East Africa. Then, based on 
150,000 elephants in East Africa (see Table 1), we postulate the following linear marginal 
tourism benefit function assuming further that marginal benefits are zero at the extant 
population:
14  
(15)   R′(x) = 2000 – 0.0133 x.   (East  Africa) 
Assume that, for Southern Africa, total tourism benefits amount to $250 million, 
based on approximately 300,000 elephants; for Central Africa, tourism is assumed to 
provide only $20 million of tourist-related benefits to approximately 200,000 elephants; 
comparable values for West Africa are $2 million in benefits for 20,000 animals. Based on 
these values and making the same calculations as for East Africa, we get the following 
marginal tourist-related benefit functions: 
(16)   R′(x) = 1680 – 0.0056 x.   (Southern  Africa) 
(17)   R′(x) = 200 – 0.0010 x.   (Central  Africa) 
(18)   R′(x) = 267 – 0.0178 x.   (West  Africa) 
Lastly, it is necessary to determine the benefits that accrue as a result of holding 
elephants in situ. These benefits accrue primarily to people in developed countries and 
represent their annual willingness to pay to preserve elephant populations in Africa. Assume 
there are 200 million households in Europe and North America and each is WTP some 
amount annually to preserve elephants. Assume that the marginal benefit (marginal WTP) 
function is linear: B′(x)=a–bx, and that people are unwilling to pay to preserve elephants in 
                                                 
13 In a recent issue of Pachyderm (vol. 38, http://www.iucn.org/themes/ssc/sgs/afesg/pachy/), several 
articles report on human-elephant encounters and crop damage. These suggest that overall damages 
are small (except perhaps for the few farmers whose crops are affected) and a function of the land’s 
nearness to an elephant conservation area. As noted earlier, elephants appear to avoid leaving 
protected areas except to raid when the need arises. 
14 Let m be the vertical intercept of R′(x). Then, based on the formula for the area of a triangle, m = 
(assumed total tourist-related benefits) ÷ (½ × elephant population). The slope of R′(x) is simply the 
negative of m divided by the elephant population. 
  18situ beyond extant numbers (Table 1). Consider three cases that are labeled ‘Lo’, ‘Mid’ or 
‘Hi’ according to the amount households are willing to pay each year for elephant 
conservation. For the ‘Lo’ scenario assume a=1500 and b=0.0022, so that 
B(x=676,500)=$511.3 million with each household contributing $2.56/year on average. For 
the ‘Mid’ scenario, assume a=3600, b=0.0053, so that B(x=676,500)=$1222.6 million with 
each household paying some $6.11 per year; and, finally, for the ‘Hi’ scenario, assume  
a=5400,  b=0.0079, so that B(x=676,500)=$1845.4 million with each household paying 
$9.23 per year.
15 Alternatively, it is assumed that rich countries provide a fixed conservation 
payment of $75 per elephant in the ‘Lo’ scenario, and $175 and $260 per animal in the 
‘Mid’ and ‘Hi’ scenarios, respectively. These payments amount to a transfer of about 10% of 
total benefits (as calculated above) that elephants provide rich countries. Unlike tourism 
benefits, conservation payments are based on total elephants in Africa, regardless of the 
region in which they are found. 
V. RESULTS 
The outcomes of different strategies are examined using a series of mathematical 
programs coded in GAMS and solved using the MINOS5 nonlinear solver, and the CPLEX 
quadratic programming solver (Brooke et al. 2005). The simulations are for 200 years 
(periods), although data are reported only for 50 periods. This is done to eliminate the 
‘end-point effect’: it is optimal to harvest the entire stock of animals in the last several 
periods if they have no (‘salvage’) value beyond the end of the planning horizon. That is, as 
one nears the end of the 200-year planning horizon, all animals will be harvested unless 
they have no value, or the (marginal) cost of harvesting the next animal is less than the 
marginal benefit.
16
Given the richness of the model, it is possible to explore only a limited number of 
scenarios and variables. Since a major concern of animal welfare groups is the conservation 
of elephants in the wild, the focus is primarily on the effects of various scenarios on animal 
numbers. The most surprising result of the analysis relates to non-market benefits, namely, 
the contribution of elephants to countries’ tourism benefits and the effect that conservation 
payments from rich countries to range states have on optimal elephant stocks. Tourist 
benefits accrue to regions on the basis of a region’s elephant herd and its attractiveness to 
tourists, while per animal conservation payment are made on the basis of the total number 
of elephants preserved in any given year – each region is paid some amount per animal 
multiplied by the total number of elephants conserved in that region. 
                                                 
15 See previous footnote regarding the method of calculation. Using the values in the text, the 
marginal WTP function intersects the abscissa at 692,307 elephants for the ‘Lo’ scenario, 679,245 
elephants for the ‘Mid’ case, and 683,544 elephants in the ‘Hi’ scenario. 
16 At a discount rate of 5%, $1 accruing in 50 (100) years is worth $0.0872 ($0.0076) today; at 20%, 
it is worth $0.0001 ($0) today. Values 200 years from now are worth nothing today. 
  19The Effect of Poaching in a Free-Trade Environment 
Consider first the case of free trade. The model can be solved by either maximizing 
global or African well being. The difference between these two perspectives concerns the 
surplus accruing to consumers of ivory – the first term in the objective function (1). As 
indicated in Appendix B for a variety of scenarios, the optimal population of elephants to 
conserve is slightly higher from the African as opposed to global perspective, because the 
global decision maker would take into account the surplus accruing to consumers of ivory 
products, thus selling more ivory and harvesting more animals. Since there is no global 
planner and decisions regarding elephants ultimately reside with the range states, only the 
African perspective is considered in what follows. 
It is argued that poaching is the major problem of elephant conservation. Would the 
elimination of poaching benefit the African elephant? We eliminate poaching in the model 
by setting the confiscation rate at 100% – since any elephants taken by poachers would be 
confiscated, there are no illegal harvests. A comparison of optimal elephant stocks, harvests 
and sales of ivory under free trade with and without poaching for discount rates of 5% and 
20% (and with inclusion of tourism benefits) is found in Figure 4. Optimal elephant stocks 
are slightly higher when a 5% discount rate and free trade with poaching are assumed than 
when there is no poaching, although the difference is very small (Figure 4a). The optimal 
elephant stock is just under 550,000 elephants in both cases. For a 20% discount rate, 
however, the presence of poachers reduces optimal elephant stocks from about 250,000 to 
about 300,000.   
When poachers are present, states take into account sales of illegal ivory by reducing 
legal harvests to such an extent that illegal harvests nearly replace all state-sanctioned 
harvests, which fall to zero regardless of the discount rate, although sales of legal ivory 
from stockpiles continue (see Figures 4b, 4c and 5). Total harvests are nearly the same 
whether poachers are present or not, although harvests in the 5% scenario are higher than 
those in the 20% scenario (not shown), mainly because of the higher levels of harvesting 
early on in the latter case (as future harvests have lower present value). Note in Figure 4b 
the spike in legal and illegal harvests around the 10
th and 12
th periods, respectively, for the 
no poaching and poaching cases. This is due to the rapid depletion of ivory stocks, which 
fall to nearly zero in the case of poaching and approach zero in the longer run in the no 
poaching case (Figure 4c).   
Surprisingly, poaching seems to have little impact: in the absence of poaching, 
optimal elephant numbers will be only very slightly higher than when poachers are present. 
The key is earnings related to in situ stocks. Because tourism benefits are significant, range 
states simply adjust to the activities of poachers. In the first few years of free trade, range 
states sell off as much of their stockpiled ivory as is optimal, with the speed at which this is 
done directly related to the cost of holding stocks (see Figure 5). Once stocks have been 
reduced, legal ivory is occasionally sold as range states participate in the market only to sell 
off any ivory stocks they may have accumulated as a result of confiscations, and rarely kill 
  20elephants for that purpose. Almost all ivory that is sold comes from illegal harvests. Thus, 
when comparing the trade case with and without poaching, range states only lose to 
poachers the surplus associated with the sale of ivory, but they make up for it through 
tourism benefits and/or conservation payments from developed countries. 
Benefits of Tourism versus Conservation Payments 
Although not shown here, if countries receive payments for preserving elephants in 
situ (and they take into account the tourism benefits that elephants provide), the effect of 
poaching on elephant numbers is nearly insignificant. In the absence of tourism benefits, 
conservation payments can prevent elephants from going extinct, assuming that appropriate 
institutions are in place and the amount that rich countries actually pay depends on the 
choices elephant owners (presumably range state governments) make. The simulation 
results do indicate that, under free trade and in the absence of conservation payments and/or 
recognition of the elephant’s contribution to tourism, there is a ‘race to the bottom’ as it is 
optimal to drive the elephant to extinction (Figure 6). The rate of decline in elephant 
populations is determined by the (social) discount rate. As indicated in Figure 6a, at a 
discount rate of 5%, it takes some 40 years for the elephant to disappear, but it takes less 
than 10 years if the discount rate is 20% (Figure 6b). Given that real rates of discount in 
developing countries tend to be high (perhaps 20% or higher), this result provides strong 
support for the possibility that elephant populations declined by half during the 1980s and 
that the ivory trade ban prevented the total demise of the species. 
The simulation results in Figure 6 also indicate that, in order to protect the elephant, 
it really does not matter whether it is conservation transfers from rich countries to range 
states or recognition by range states that elephants contribute to tourism. Rather, as long as a 
meaningful link is made between elephant numbers and their non-market value, it is optimal 
for countries to protect elephants and keep them from going extinct.
17 In the case of tourism 
benefits, range states will find it optimal to maintain more than 500,000 animals if a 
discount rate of 5% is employed, and about 300,000 if the higher rate of 20% is used.   
It is interesting to note that, when conservation payments vary according to marginal 
WTP, optimal stock levels are lower than in the case where only tourism benefits are taken 
into account. This is clear from Figures 6a and 6b, where the introduction of conservation 
payments actually reduces the optimal stock level. Indeed, it is optimal for countries to 
reduce their stocks of elephants in the first several periods so as to increase the total transfer 
from rich countries for in situ elephants (as the ‘price’ increase offsets the reduced numbers 
for which payment is made). This is most pronounced for the lower discount rate (Figure 
6a). This result holds because (some) range states recognize that they can influence the per 
animal conservation payment by manipulating elephant stocks. The alternative option is that 
rich countries provide a fixed conservation payment per elephant. If a fixed conservation 
                                                 
17 The link between elephant populations and non-market benefits might be meaningless if 
institutions and governance structures are lacking. This is a real problem in Africa, as indicated in 
Table 4 and noted by Bulte, van Kooten and Swanson (2003). 
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of elephants, generally raising it above that associated with a ‘variable’ payment based on 
marginal willingness to pay (Figure 7).   
Finally, just because in situ values are taken into account, this does not guarantee 
that the elephant survives in all regions. In Figure 8, the following scenario is provided: ‘Hi’ 
conservation payments, recognition of tourism benefits and a low discount rate. (See 
Appendix B for other scenarios.) In this case, it is optimal to allow the elephant to go 
extinct in Central and West Africa. Nonetheless, the good news is that extinction can be 
avoided and their long-term survival ensured even when the future is heavily discounted if 
non-market benefits are ‘sufficiently large’ and such benefits are actually tied to animal 
numbers. In the absence of the ‘non-market benefit effect’, the crucial question is: Can a 
trade ban mitigate the species’ demise? 
Ivory Trade Ban 
The simulation results indicate that a trade ban on ivory may or may not be 
successful in conserving the African elephant. Regardless of the discount rate used, for the 
supply-curve intercept parameter values found in Table 3, poaching will cause the elephant 
to go extinct in less than twenty years (see Appendix B), despite the fact that the demand 
curve has shifted inwards as a result of the so-called stigma effect. That is, the stigma effect 
brought about by the trade ban is not a sufficient condition for protecting the elephant. 
Indeed, for the parameters of the illegal, trade-ban supply functions given in Table 3, even 
an increase in the confiscation rate from 5% to 50% is unable to protect the elephant. This is 
obvious from Figure 9 which shows the rising stockpile of ivory that occurs in range states 
– it quickly comes to an equilibrium (indicating extirpation of the elephant), with the 
equilibrium higher when poaching gangs use a lower discount rate (which is unlikely).
18  
Although not shown, it is possible to specify intercept and slope parameters for the 
poaching supply functions (while maintaining the initial equilibrium condition) that lead to 
rising elephant populations. This suggests that actions to control the international movement 
of ivory might be more effective than on-the-ground attempts to increase policing of 
poachers, although this needs to be investigated further using data from MIKE and ETIS 
(see Bulte, Damania and van Kooten 2006). Whatever the case, if range states and 
international organizations are not vigilant in monitoring and enforcing a trade ban, it is 
unlikely to be effective.   
One problem with a trade ban is that it leads to increasing stockpiles of ivory as a 
result of anti-poaching enforcement (confiscations) and culling of animals. Since range 
states are currently unable to sell these stocks without permission, stockpiles will rise: In the 
current simulations, legally-held ivory stockpiles could rise by between 5% and more than 
20%. If the trade ban is effective, however, stockpiles could potentially rise much more in 
the long run. As a result, some range states will continue to agitate for continued sales of 
                                                 
18 Notice in Figure 9 that the confiscation rate is more important than the discount rate. 
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international negotiations. One alternative is to return to a quota system – or an ivory cartel.   
Ivory Cartel 
It is assumed that, if range states can form an ivory cartel, they can also cooperate to 
eliminate poaching (perhaps using genetic coding to ensure that only ‘approved’ ivory 
enters the market). Further, since the formation of a cartel constitutes a signal that African 
range states are concerned only about their own well being, conservation payments from 
developed countries for in situ elephants are ignored. Under these assumptions, 
unfortunately, an ivory cartel does not ensure the elephant’s survival. Indeed, a cartel is only 
effective in protecting the elephant if in situ values are taken into account. In that case, there 
is little difference between the cartel and no cartel results.   
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of this study provides one very important conclusion: Unless the 
contribution of living elephants to the well being of citizens in range states (via the tourist 
sector) or in rich countries (through their willingness to pay to ensure the existence of 
elephants now and in the future) is taken into account, the elephant is most likely to remain 
a species under threat of extinction. This is not enough, however: Range states must 
recognize and act upon the link between elephants and tourism benefits and/or citizens in 
rich countries must make effectual payments for elephant preservation. Further, to prevent 
the stock of elephants from falling to the lowest level required to ensure their flagship or 
preservation status, non-market benefits must increase with elephant numbers (albeit at a 
decreasing rate) and must reach those with the ability to take action.   
Any solution that involves payments to range states or a requirement on their part to 
increase monitoring and enforcement is bound to involve some risk. The reason is that 
African range states in general lack the institutions and governance structures that 
characterize developed countries (see Table 4; Bulte, van Kooten and Swanson 2003). Low 
incomes, lack of property rights, government corruption and other characteristics of these 
countries do not bode well for their ability to prevent further declines in elephant 
populations, as least not without the vigilance of developed countries and the aid of 
international agencies. In some ways, the elephant is similar to the bison that once roamed 
the Great Plains of North America. Despite the emergence of institutional entrepreneurs 
who exploited the natural resources available on the frontier, the bison was doomed because 
the land was much more valuable in cattle production than it was producing bison, even if 
these could somehow be domesticated (see Anderson and Hill 2004, pp.94-102). Likewise, 
without conservation or some other form of side payments made to those with a stake in the 
land, elephants are less valuable than agricultural crops, and unable to compete for land. 
Given the situation in many (if not all) range states, tourism benefits are unlikely to 
be realized, which is certainly the case of countries in Central Africa. Clearly, the role of 
countries outside of Africa is crucial. One option implemented by the international 
  23community (with the support of most African states) has been a trade ban. The ban is an 
attempt to reduce demand for ivory through a stigma effect, while increasing the costs of 
poaching and marketing ivory by monitoring and enforcement that are funded by rich 
countries. While the stigma and supply-side effects of a trade ban are important, their 
existence is essentially speculative. Research of a different kind than that reported here is 
required to determine if they are indeed real. If they are not real and/or organized gangs of 
poachers are able to mitigate increases in supply-side costs or even reduce them, the trade 
ban cannot be relied upon on its own (as evidenced by the results of this study). If tourism 
benefits are also not realized, one can only conclude that intervention by rich countries is 
required in the form of conservation payments tied to the numbers of elephants that range 
states conserve. As indicated in Figure 7, the payment schedule will have a large impact on 
range states’ optimal elephant numbers, and the subsequent effort that range states make in 
policing herds. In the case of international transfer payments, it will be necessary to design 
an appropriate incentive scheme that does not enable range states to reduce elephant 
numbers in order to maximize returns from such payments. 
The results of the model presented here are indicative only. Further research is 
certainly warranted to make the relations in the model more realistic. The demand function 
in the analysis is essentially static, but it should perhaps be modeled as a function of time. It 
is not clear, however, whether demand should be modeled as shifting outwards or inwards 
over time – whether on a global level increasing aversion to the killing of elephants 
outweighs other factors that might increase the demand for elephant products (e.g., bush 
meat). Further, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the legal and illegal 
takings of elephants. The effect of monitoring and enforcement needs to be explicitly taken 
into account; the supply of illegal ivory needs to be modeled as a function of anti-poaching 
expenditures and of the supply of legal ivory. At the same time, it is necessary to take into 
account the reactions of the state to supplies of illegal ivory when free trade is permitted, or 
when states act to form an ivory cartel. Currently, illegal marketing of ivory is taken as 
given, while, in the case of the cartel, it was simply assumed that poachers were driven out 
of the market, which may simply be too expensive a proposition. These interactions 
certainly warrant further investigation. 
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1989 275,600 110,650 203,300 18,380 609,919
1995
Definite 7,320 90,482 170,837 2,760 286,234
Probable 81,657 16,707 16,402 1,376 101,297
Possible 128,648 19,999 18,983 5,035 155,944
Speculative 7,594 1,084 21,825 5,554 36,057
Total 225,219 128,272 228,047 14,725 617,264
1998
Definite 7,322 83,770 196,845 2,489 301,773
Probable 27,104 22,698 17,057 644 56,196
Possible 27,613 17,216 22,623 6,228 60,780
Speculative 63,469 1,495 190 3,442 68,596
Total 125,508 125,179 236,715 12,803 521,809
2002
Definite 16,450 117,716 246,592 5,458 402,067
Probable 32,263 17,702 23,722 1,188 59,024
Possible 64,477 22,511 26,098 3,039 99,813
Speculative 82,563 5,738 7,508 3,498 99,307
Total 195,753 163,667 303,920 13,183 676,523  
Notes: 
Sources: 1989 data – ITRG (1989); 1995 data – Said et al. (1995); 1998 
data – Barnes et al. (1999); 2002 data – Blanc et al. (2003) 
Totals may not sum due to the method used to develop population 
estimates. A list of countries included in each region is available in each 
of the cited documents. 
 
  28Table 2: Seizures of Elephant Products and Demand for Poached Elephants by Region
a
Region 





Estimated number of 
elephants poached per year
c
  1989 1990-2003 carvers
c Minimum Maximum
Africa 112  140.9 627 4,648  11,710
Central Africa  0  2.0 198 1,770  4,453
East Africa  34  36.4 35 216  545
Southern Africa  70  98.9 132 841  2,122









Europe 169  206.9 n.a. n.a.  n.a.
North America  0  206.6 n.a. n.a.  n.a.
Oceania 10  35.4 n.a. n.a.  n.a.
Notes: 
a Central and South America and other regions are excluded because seizures reported to ETIS were 
insignificant; n.a. indicates not applicable, not known or not provided.  
b Source: Calculated from data in Milliken et al. (2004). Year 2004 data are omitted because not all 
information was available at the time this table was constructed. 
c Source: Hunter, Martin and Milliken (2004) 
d Carvers working with ivory originating from Africa are indicated with those using Asian elephant 
products provided in parentheses; annual number of African elephants required, with Asian elephants 
in parentheses.  
 








Central 25% 30 0.00054 60% 45 0.00070 60% 60 0.00650
East 20% 10 0.00079 15% 35 0.00307 15% 45 0.02700
Southern 50% 50 0.00022 20% 75 0.00150 20% 85 0.01825
West 5% 20 0.00292 5% 35 0.00920 5% 45 0.08100
With Ivory Trade





Table 4: Summary Indicators of Governance and an Index of Law Enforcement 
Item  Central Africa  East Africa  Southern Africa  West Africa 
Government effectiveness
a -1.07 -0.88 -0.32 -0.88
Regulatory quality
a -1.02 -0.92 -0.35 -0.70
Rule of law
a -1.08 -0.97 -0.41 -0.79
Control of corruption
a -1.13 -0.77 -0.46 -0.66
Index of law enforcement
b 0.0102 0.1668 0.8225 0.0006
Notes: 
a Source: World Bank (2005). Each index lies between -2.5 and +2.5, with lower values indicating 
poorer performance. (As an example, for each of the indexes in descending order in the left-hand 
column, Finland scores 2.01, 1.93, 1.99 and 2.39, respectively.) 
b Total number of in-region seizures divided by total seizures in Africa, and normalized for the 
number of elephants in the region. 










1. Total area (km
2) 5,365,550 6,182,037 5,973,020 5,096,660  22,617,267
2. Elephant range area (km
2) 2,060,763 969,113 1,680,130 219,868  4,929,874
3. Range as % of total  38% 16% 28% 4%  22%
4. % of total area protected    5% 4% 4% 2%  8%
5. % of range in protected area    12% 24% 13% 40%  16%
6. Elephants per km
2 of range  0.095 0.169 0.181 0.060  0.137
7. Average carrying capacity    0.162 0.236 0.220 0.190  0.198
8. Elephant carrying capacity  333,844 228,711 369,629 41,775  973,959
9. Ivory stocks in 1996 (kg)    204,138 170,677 316,938 13,747  705,500
10. Confiscated ivory (kg)  16 291 791 8  1,106
11. Total ivory stocks (kg)  204,154 170,968 317,729 13,755  706,606
12. Assumed ivory stocks (kg)  250,000 200,000 400,000 50,000  900,000
Notes: 
Source for rows 1 – 5: Blanc et al. (2003); Rows 6 – 12: own calculation. Values in row 7 assume 
that for forest elephants (Central and West Africa) carrying capacity is 0.15 elephants per km
2 in 
unprotected range and 0.25 per km
2 in protected range. For savanna elephants (East and Southern 
Africa), capacities are assumed to be 0.2 for unprotected and 0.35 for protected range. Numbers in 
row 9 represent the allocation of total ivory stocks at the end of 1996 in proportion to each region’s 
elephant numbers. Row 10 represents estimated confiscations of ivory per year multiplied by eight 
years (assuming approximately 0.5 kg per seizure but doubling that to take account of culls, killing 
of nuisance animals, etc.). Row 11 is the sum of rows 9 and 10. Row 12 constitutes the assumed 
levels of ivory stocks in each region for initializing the model. 



















































































































Figure 3: Estimated Amount of Ivory (in 'raw ivory equivalent') Represented by ETIS 
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Figure 4a: Optimal Elephant Populations under Trade, with Tourism Benefits, No 




















Figure 4b: Legal and Illegal Elephant Harvests under Trade, with Tourism Benefits, 
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Figure 4c: Ivory Stocks and Ivory Sales under Trade, with Tourism Benefits, No 


























Figure 5: Ivory Stocks Held by Range States under Trade, with Tourism Benefits, No 
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Figure 6a: Race to the Bottom: Optimal Elephant Populations with and without 
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Figure 6b: Race to the Bottom: Optimal Elephant Populations with and without 





















Figure 7: Optimal Elephant Stocks: A Comparison of a Fixed versus ‘Variable’ versus 
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Figure 8: Optimal Elephant Stocks for Various African Regions, ‘Hi’ Conservation 




























Figure 9: Ivory Stockpiles under an Ivory Trade Ban, by Discount Rate (%) and 
Proportion Confiscated 
 
  37APPENDIX A: NOTES PERTAINING TO THE CALCULATION OF THE OBJECTIVE 
FUNCTION FOR USE IN THE GAMS PROGRAMMING MODEL   
We calculate the consumer surplus as the area under the excess demand function. To 
this we add the net revenue to range states. Let the excess demand function be linear: 
(A1)  p






Assume that the individual regional marginal cost (supply) of ivory functions are given by: 





























β α . 
The total revenue is 
(A3) TR  =  p
d Q = (a – b Q) Q, 
while the consumer surplus is 
(A4)  CS = ½ (a – p
d) Q = ½ bQ
2. 
The total benefit from sales of ivory in any period is given by the sum of TR and CS. 
(A5)  TR + CS = (a – ½ b Q) Q. 
On the supply side, it is possible that, in some periods, one or more regions do not have 
enough ivory to sell, or they prefer not to harvest elephants and/or hold ivory in stocks. In 
those cases, demand price exceeds regional marginal cost. To obtain the net surplus in the 
ivory market, it is necessary to subtract from total benefit the sum of the individual regional 
total costs. For any given period, the total cost of supplying ivory is: 
(A6) TC  = ()   ∑ ∑ ∑
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  The net surplus in the international market for ivory in a given period is then: 
(A6)  NS = TR + CS – TC = [a Q – ½ b Q
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] 5 . 0 [ β αAPPENDIX B: DETAILED RESULTS OF VARIOUS SCENARIOS 
African versus Global Perspective 
African range states have greater control than other countries over elephant numbers 
(through decisions regarding habitat conservation, rules governing property rights, funding 
for anti-poaching efforts, penalties for poaching, and so on) and movement/trade of raw and 
worked ivory. Thus, it is appropriate to take an African as opposed to global perspective. 
This does not rule out conservation payments made by rich countries to range states to 
protect elephants, however. A global decision maker includes the surplus to ivory consumers 
in objective function (1), while it is ignored by an African decision maker. Consider the 
implications of taking an African viewpoint in the case of free trade with poaching. 
If non-market benefits from tourism and elephant conservation are completely ignored, and 
a discount rate of 5% is employed, there is a race to the bottom – elephant populations 
collapse in some 30 years if a global perspective is taken and 40 years if an African 
perspective is taken (Figure B1). Elephant populations first collapse in Southern, Central 
and West Africa followed by those in East Africa. The elephant’s demise occurs even sooner 
if a discount rate of 20% is used. Although not directly comparable because sales of ivory 
and harvests of elephants differ, the net discounted global surplus over the 200-year time 
horizon is $3.01 billion while the African surplus is $2.22 billion (see Table B1). The reason 
why the optimal population is higher from the perspective of an African as opposed to a 
global decision maker is that the African decision maker ignores benefits accruing to 
consumers of ivory. 
If a low discount rate of 5% is employed and countries are concerned about tourism benefits, 
the elephant’s demise is preventable (see Figure B2). In this case, a decision maker with a 
global perspective will choose to conserve slightly more elephants in situ than would one 
who takes only an African perspective, although the differences in each region are small. 
The global surplus is $11.53 billion, while the African surplus is $10.79 billion (Table B1). 
However, if a discount rate of 20% is assumed (Figure B3), elephants will disappear in less 
than 10 years (global perspective) or somewhat more than 10 years (African perspective) in 
West and Central Africa, but will stabilize at about 80,000 animals in East Africa and 
slightly more than 160,000 in Southern Africa (with the optimal ‘steady state’ somewhat 
higher if the African perspective is adopted). Global surplus is $3.88 billion, while African 
surplus is $3.32 billion (Table B1). 
Conservation payments from rich countries to African range states reduce the optimal stocks 
of elephants that countries hold compared to the case where only tourism benefits are taken 
into account.
19 Upon comparing the bottom diagram in Figure B2 with the top diagrams in 
Figures B4 and B5, it is clear that, for a 5% discount rate, conservations payments reduce 
                                                 
19 In the scenarios reported in Figures B4 and B5, conservation payments are made according to the 
total area under the marginal WTP curve rather than as a fixed payment per elephant. 
  39the optimal stock of elephants. However, in the absence of tourism benefits, conservation 
payments actually increase optimal elephant stocks, significantly so that the elephant’s 
demise is prevented (see Figure 6 in the main text). From a regional perspective, elephants 
will go extinct in every region if tourism benefits are ignored and no conservation payments 
are made (Figure B6), although it takes almost 40 years for this to occur for a low discount 
rate and less than 10 years for a high discount rate. When conservation payments are made 
according to a downward sloping schedule, and there are no tourism benefits, a fine dance 
occurs between the regions (see Figure B7). In this particular model and for a 5% discount 
rate, elephants disappear in West and (surprisingly) Southern Africa, while they disappear in 
all regions but Southern Africa for a 20% discount rate. Clearly, a fixed payment is 
preferred to a variable one, but if the latter is used a game theoretic model might be more 
appropriate (although this is left for future research).     
The Curse of Time Preference 
Partly because of people’s poverty but also because of the uncertainty created by the poor 
governance structures in developing countries, it is necessary to employ a much higher rate 
of discount than that used in richer countries. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to employ a 
discount rate of 20% in evaluating investment programs, even public ones. People’s rates of 
time preference are generally much higher that they are in developed countries. The higher 
discount rate leads to a greater chance that the elephant will not survive without some form 
of intervention by rich countries, even if this amounts to helping African states to link 
elephant populations to tourism benefits. In all cases, elephants will disappear rapidly unless 
they provide tourist-related benefits or conservation payments from rich nations to poor 
African states take place. Even then, optimal elephant stocks are substantially lower with 
the 20% discount rate, with optimal stocks in Central and West Africa prone to collapse 
while those in East and Southern Africa decline significantly (see Figures B1, B3 through 
B7). The only thing that prevents their demise in the latter regions is the existence of 
tourism benefits; without these, populations might collapse if an African decision maker 
manages continent elephant stocks to take advantage of compensation payments from rick 
countries to poor African states, and tourism benefits are taken into account (compare the 
bottom diagram of Figure B2 with the top diagram of Figure B4). As indicated in Figure B6, 
if there are no non-market benefits whatsoever, the effect of the higher discount rate is to 
bring about a very rapid collapse of elephant stocks, even more rapid than has been noted 
for the 1980s.   
The Ivory Trade Ban 
Figure 8 illustrates the effect of a trade ban. Here the discount rate is that employed by the 
poaching gangs. In all cases, the elephant disappears, although the rate of its demise is 
slower for lower discount rates. Of course, these results are based on only one scenario 
concerning the illegal supply functions and confiscation rate (although it was shown not to 
have much effect in the range of 0% to 50%) and other assumptions about the costs of 
marketing illegal ivory could result in increasing populations. However, they do suggest 
that the trade ban may not be effective without greater monitoring and enforcement. 
  40Table B1: Comparison of the Discounted Value of Total Benefits, Tourism Benefits and 
Conservation Payments, Various Scenarios and Discount Rates (1990 US$ × 10
9) 
 5%    20% 
Scenario Total  Tourism Conserve 
payment
Total Tourism Conserve 
payment
1. No in situ benefits  2.22  0.00 0.00 1.06 0.00  0.00
2. Tourism benefits, no 
conservation payments 
10.78 8.85 0.00 3.32 2.47  0.00
3. Tourism benefits, ‘Lo’ 
conservation payments 
15.37 8.33 5.00 4.50 2.38  1.25
4. Tourism benefits, ‘Mid’ 
conservation payments 
22.38 8.20 12.14 6.25 2.36  3.04
5. Tourism benefits, ‘Hi’ 
conservation payments 
28.62 8.16 18.42 7.83 2.35  4.63
6. No tourism benefits, ‘Mid’ 
conservation payments 
14.29 0.00 12.23 3.93 0.00  3.05
7. No poaching, tourism 
benefits, no conservation 
payments 
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Figure B1: Optimal Elephant Populations under Trade with No Conservation Side 
Payments, No Tourism Benefits and 5% Discount Rate, African Regions: Top Diagram 
Shows Global Perspective, Bottom Diagram Shows African Perspective





































Central  East  South  West 
 
Figure B2: Optimal Elephant Populations under Trade with Tourism Benefits, No 
Conservation Side Payments and 5% Discount Rate, African Regions: Top Diagram 
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Figure B3: Optimal Elephant Populations under Trade with Tourism Benefits, No 
Conservation Side Payments and 20% Discount Rate, African Regions: Top Diagram 
Shows Global Perspective, Bottom Diagram Shows African Perspective 
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Figure B4: Optimal Elephant Populations under Trade with Tourism Benefits, Lo 
Conservation Side Payments, African Regions: Top Diagram Shows 5% Discount Rate, 
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Figure B5: Optimal Elephant Populations under Trade with Tourism Benefits, Hi 
Conservation Side Payments, African Regions: Top Diagram Shows 5% Discount Rate, 




































Central  East  South  West 
 
Figure B6: Optimal Elephant Populations under Trade with No Tourism Benefits and 
No Conservation Side Payments, African Regions: Top Diagram Shows 5% Discount 





































Central  East  South  West 
 
Figure B7: Optimal Elephant Populations under Trade with No Tourism Benefits and 
Mid Conservation Side Payments, African Regions: Top Diagram Shows 5% Discount 
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Figure B8: Race to the Bottom: Optimal Elephant Populations under a Trade Ban 
with 5% (Top) and 50% (Bottom) Confiscation Rates, 5% Discount Rate 
  49QP_ivory_trade






* This is the ivory trade model. It consists of an objective function
* which is to maximize net benefits (either consumer plus producer
* surplus or simply what producers get -- whether these are countries
* or illegal harvesters (depends on how the model is run), elephant
* growth and harvest constraints, an excess demand function, four
* African regional supply functions, an ivory stock constraint and
* sustainability constraints. Supply and demand functions are affected




  t         years in the time horizon       /1*200/
  r         Four African regions            /cent, east, south, west/
  ;
SETS
  tinit(t)  first time period
  tfinal(t) final time period
  ;
  tinit(t)=yes$(ord(t) eq 1);
  tfinal(t)=yes$(ord(t) eq card(t));
SCALARS
  dint      intercept of excess demand function with no trade ban
  dslope    slope of excess demand function with no trade ban
  drate     discount rate
  gamma     conversion factor gives kg of ivory per elephant
  damage    annual ecosystem damage caused by one elephant
  storage   Costs to African country of storing ivory each period
  harvcost  Constant elephant harvest
  benalt    Fixed conservation payment per x if WTP function not used
  benpar0   Parameter on in situ benefit function:
  benpar1      B(x)=benpar0*x - benpar1*x^2
  growth    Intrinsic growth rate of the elephant stock









  benalt = 0;
* Lo scenario $75, Mid $175, Hi $260
  benpar0=00;
* Lo scenario 1500, Mid is 3600, Hi is 5400
  benpar1=0.00;
* Lo scenario 0.0022, Mid is 0.0053, Hi is 0.0079
  growth=0.067;
  confis=0.05;
PARAMETER int(r)    intercept on legal supply functions
  /cent    30
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   east    10
   south   50
   west    20 /;
PARAMETER slope(r)  slopes of legal supply functions
  /cent    0.00054
   east    0.00079
   south   0.00022
   west    0.00292 /;
PARAMETER int2(r)  intercept on illegal supply functions
  /      cent     45
         east     35
         south    75
         west     35  /;
PARAMETER slope2(r) slopes of illegal supply functions
  /      cent    0.0007
         east    0.00307
         south   0.0015
         west    0.0092  /;
PARAMETER tour(r) intercepts of linear marginal tourism benefit function
  /cent    200
   east    2000
   south   1680
   west    267 /;
PARAMETER stour(r)  slopes of linear marginal tourism benefit function
  /cent    -0.0010
   east    -0.0133
   south   -0.0056
   west    -0.0178 /;
PARAMETER xstart(r)  initial elephant stocks
  /cent    195753
   east    163667
   south   303920
   west    13183 /;
PARAMETER cc(r)  elephant ecosystem carrying capacity by region
  /cent    333844
   east    228711
   south   369629
   west    41775 /;
PARAMETER vstart(r)  initial ivory stock in region r
  /cent   250000
   east   200000
   south  400000
   west   50000  /;
PARAMETERS
  i(t)       counting parameter for discounting




  loop (t, i(t+1) = i(t)+1);
  beta(t) = 1/((1+drate)**i(t));
VARIABLES
  z1             objective value for gloval wellbeing with poaching ($ mil)
  z2             objective value for African wellbeing with poaching ($ mil)
  harv(t,r)      legal harvest of elephants by region and period
  x(t,r)         elephant numbers by region and period
  ivory(t,r)     ivory stocks by region and period (kg)
  q(t,r)         ivory sold by each region in each period (kg)
  harv2(t,r)     illegal harvest of elephants by region and period
  q2(t,r)        illegal ivory sold by each region in each period (kg)
  dprice(t)      demand price in each year
  elephant(t)    stock of elephants in each period
  sales(t)       total annual sales of ivory
  ;
Positive VARIABLES x, harv, harv2, ivory, q, q2, dprice, sales, elephant;
EQUATIONS
  maxrev1         objective function for globla welfare ($US mil)
  maxrev2         objective function for African welfare ($US mil)
  ostock(t,r)     opening stocks of elephants
  oivory(t,r)     opening stocks of ivory
  ivoryeq(t,r)    ivory stock equation of motion
  popeq(t,r)      elephant population equation of motion
  ivor(t,r)       constraint on quantity of ivory sold by region
  ivor2(t,r)      illegal supply of ivory from each region
  demandp(t)      excess demand price in each period
  mktclr(t,r)     market clearing price condition for legal ivory sales
  mktclr2(t,r)    market clearing price condition for illegal ivory sales
  cartel(t,r)     market clearing condition for cartel
  harvest(t,r)    restrict total harvests to a proportion of all elephants
  carry(t,r)      elephants cannot exceed carrying capacity
  sumq(t)         total ivory sold in each year
  sumx(t)         total elephant stock in each year
  ;
* Supply and demand functions are in inverse (price dependent) format
* --------------------------------------------------------
* Construction of actual constrained optimization model
* --------------------------------------------------------
maxrev1..   z1 =E= (sum(t, beta(t)*((dint-0.5*dslope*sales(t))*sales(t)
                 - sum(r, (int(r)+0.5*slope(r)*q(t,r))*q(t,r))
                 + sum(r, (tour(r)+0.5*stour(r)*x(t,r))*x(t,r))
                 - harvcost*sum(r, harv(t,r))
                 - storage*sum(r, ivory(t,r))
                 - damage*sum(r, x(t,r))
                 + (benpar0 - 0.5*benpar1*elephant(t))*elephant(t)
                 )))/1000000 ;
maxrev2..   z2 =E= (sum(t, beta(t)*((dint - dslope*sales(t))*sales(t)
                 - sum(r, (int(r)+0.5*slope(r)*q(t,r))*q(t,r))
*                 + sum(r, (tour(r)+0.5*stour(r)*x(t,r))*x(t,r))
                 + (benpar0 - benpar1*sum(r, x(t,r)))*sum(r, x(t,r))
                 + benalt*sum(r, x(t,r))
                 - harvcost*sum(r, harv(t,r))
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                 - storage*sum(r, ivory(t,r))
                 - damage*sum(r, x(t,r))
                 )))/1000000;
ostock(tinit,r)..  x(tinit,r) =E= xstart(r);
oivory(tinit,r)..  ivory(tinit,r) =E= vstart(r);
ivoryeq(t,r)$(not(tinit(t)))..  ivory(t,r) =E= ivory(t-1,r) +
                  gamma*harv(t-1,r) - q(t-1,r) + confis*q2(t-1,r);
ivor(t,r)..   q(t,r) =L= ivory(t,r);
ivor2(t,r)..   q2(t,r) =e= gamma*harv2(t,r)*(1-confis);
sumq(t)..     sales(t) =E= sum(r, q(t,r) + q2(t,r));
demandp(t)..  dprice(t) =E= dint - dslope * sales(t);
mktclr(t,r)..  int(r) + slope(r)*q(t,r) =l= dint - dslope * sales(t);
mktclr2(t,r)..  int2(r) + slope2(r)*q2(t,r) =l= dint - dslope * sales(t);
cartel(t,r)..  int(r) + slope(r)*q(t,r)+ harvcost/gamma =l=
                         dint - 2 * dslope * sales(t);
popeq(t,r)$(not(tinit(t)))..   x(t,r) =e= (1+growth)*x(t-1,r)
                                         - harv(t-1,r) - harv2(t-1,r);
harvest(t,r)..  harv(t,r) + harv2(t,r) =L= 0.25*x(t,r);
sumx(t)..   elephant(t) =E= sum(r, x(t,r));
carry(t,r)..   x(t, r) =l= cc(r);
Model global / maxrev1, ostock, oivory, ivoryeq, ivor, ivor2,
        demandp, popeq, mktclr, mktclr2, sumx, sumq, carry/;
Model Africa / maxrev2, ostock, oivory, ivoryeq, ivor, ivor2,
        demandp, popeq, mktclr, mktclr2, sumx, sumq, carry/;
Model IvoorCartel / maxrev2, ostock, oivory, ivoryeq, ivor, ivor2,
        demandp, popeq, cartel, mktclr2, sumx, sumq, carry/;
option solprint = off;
option qcp = Cplex;
*option nlp = conopt3;




option iterlim = 10000;
file Poach;
*file Poach /D:\My Documents\Biology\Elephants\Programs\Poach_out.txt/;
*Page width
Poach.pw=30000;
*Number of decimal places in NoPoach_out
Poach.nd=0;
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put Poach 'Run on  ' system.date  /'Using source file '/ system.ifile //;
*Solve global using qcp maximizing z1;
*Solve Africa using qcp maximizing z2;
Solve IvoorCartel using qcp maximizing z2;
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
*   This is the report writing section. Variables for report are created.
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parameters
  harvtot(t)     total annual legal take of elephants
  harvtot2(t)    total annual illegal take of elephants
  stockv(t)      total stock of ivory by year
  legal(t)       total annual legal sales of ivory
  illegal(t)     total annual illegal sales of ivory
  conserve       Discounted conservation payment
  tourben(t,r)   tourism benefits by region and period
  touristben     total tourism benefits
  ;
harvtot(t) = sum(r, harv.l(t,r));
harvtot2(t) = sum(r, harv2.l(t,r));
stockv(t) = sum(r, ivory.l(t,r));
legal(t) = sum(r,q.l(t,r));
illegal(t) = sum(r,q2.l(t,r));
conserve = sum(t, beta(t)*(benpar0 -
                      benpar1*sum(r, x.l(t,r)))*elephant.l(t))/1000000;
touristben = sum(t, beta(t)* sum(r, (tour(r)
                      + 0.5*stour(r)*x.l(t,r))*x.l(t,r)))/1000000;
put Poach;
         put "Model status ,", Africa.modelstat/;
         put "Solver status ,", Africa.solvestat/;
*         put "Global surplus ,", z1.l /;
         put "African surplus ,", z2.l /;
         put "Tourism benefits ,", touristben/;
         put "Conservation Payments ,", conserve/;
         put "," "," "," "ELEPHANTS" "," "," "," "HARVEST" "," "," "IVORY" /;
         put "Period" "," "TOTAL" "," "Central " ","
                 "East " "," "South " "," "West "
                 "," "Legal" "," "Illegal" "," "Price" "," "Sales"
                 "," "Stocks" /;
         loop(t, put t.tl "," elephant.l(t) "," x.l(t, 'cent') ","
                 x.l(t, 'east') "," x.l(t, 'south') ","
                 x.l(t, 'west') "," harvtot(t) "," harvtot2(t), ","
                 dprice.l(t) "," sales.l(t), "," stockv(t)/;);
         put/;
putclose Poach;
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